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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT MARSHALL d/b/a/ MARSHALL 
FASTENING SYSTEMS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORDFORS CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
A Utah corporation,; G.R. 
PETERSEN/ K.S. CHRISTENSEN 
DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a 
Utah corporation, FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
WILLIAM ANSLEY d/b/a/ 
ANSLEY.; WHEELER MACHINERY 
COMPANY; DAVID WURTH d/b/a/ 
WURTH TRUCKING; J.D. HECHTLE 
d/b/a/ STONE ART CO.,; TONY 
HAFEN d/b/a/ TONY HAFEN 
CONSTRUCTION & BLASTING; J.C. 
PLATT d/b/a/ PRO PLUMBING 
& HEATING; STEVEN M. LEE 
d/b/a J.G. LEE EXCAVATING; 
DREW WIRTH d/b/a/ D. WIRTH 
TRUCKING; PLUMBERS SUPPLY 
COMPANY, INC.; JACK VAN 
GERVEN d/b/a/ J & M 
CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.; 
GENE BAUMGARTNER, JOHN DOES 
I through X, and any and all 
other persons who may claim 
an interest in the property 
which is the subject of this 
action, 
Defendants, and 
Respondents 
S. G. LARSEN & SONS EXCAVATING: 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 88-0069 
Plaintiff in 
Intervention 
vs. 
BROWN & ELLIOTT CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; PETERSEN/ 
CHRISTENSEN ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah general partnership, aka 
G. R. PETERSEN/ K.S. 
CHRISTENSEN ASSOCIATES; 
B.R. HALE COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah corporation, dba B.R. 
HALE PLUMBING; H.C. HUGHES 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
DAVIDSON LUMBER SALES, INC., 
a Utah corporation; F. LYNN 
PADAN dba MILLER PADAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; CONELY 
COMPANY, dba ACQUATECH SPA AND 
TUB; A S T HEATING AND AIR 
CONDITIONING CORPORATION, INC. 
a Utah corporation; RAYEL 
JENSEN dba DIMENSION DRYWALL 
CO.; BARBARA B. GAUFIN dba 
LAKE BUILDERS SUPPLY; 
BRIGHTON MILL & SUPPLY, INC., 
a Utah corporation; CAFFALL 
TILE AND SUPPLY COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, and UNITED 
PACIFIC INSURANCE, a Wash-
ington corporation, 
Additional Cross 
Claim Defendants 
and Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
J & M contends in its brief that Rule 804 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure must be read as requiring that a proponent 
meet both rules before a deposition of an absent witness may 
be admitted. A full reading of Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure indicates that compliance with either Rule 
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32 o£ Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence would be 
sufficient. 
Should this Court hold that both Rule 32 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 804 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence were required for the admission of the 
deposition of an absent witness, the Appellants met that 
burden before the trial court. 
The Court correctly found that J & M was not 
entitled to a rescission of the excavation contract on 
either grounds of misrepresentation or mistake. J & M 
contends that misrepresentation as to the elevations on the 
plans entitled it to rescission of the contract. The 
Respondent raises this theory of the case for the first time 
on appeal. The Appellate Court should not consider this 
argument at this level. Even should the Court consider this 
argument, J & M failed to meet their burden since the 
finding of the trial court that J & M did not act reasonably 
in relying upon the statement of Scott Brown, is supported 
by substantial evidence. 
Finally, J & M is not entitled to rescission of 
the excavation contract because of its failure to time 
rescind the contract. The original contract was entered 
into sometime before June 13, 1984 and the last labor 
performed by J & M on the contract was done in October 19 84. 
No demand for rescission of the contract was made until the 
filing of this action in September of 1985. It is submitted 
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that J & M did not timely elect to rescind the contract and 
the trial court correctly refused to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS COMPLIED WITH RULE OF EVIDENCE 804 AND RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 32 AND IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
REFUSE TO ADMIT THE DEPOSITION OF SCOTT BROWN 
POINT I.A. 
RULE 80 4 AND RULE 32 MUST BE READ AS DISJUNCTIVE 
AND COMPLIANCE WITH EITHER MAY FORM THE BASIS 
FOR ADMISSION OF THE DEPOSITION OF SCOTT BROWN 
Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
indicates that hearsay may be admissible if an exception is 
provided by "other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. . 
. ." Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes no 
such provision. Respondent seized upon this difference 
between the two rules to conclude that Utah requires that a 
proponent of deposition testimony must meet the requirements 
of both Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in order to admit a 
witness1 deposition in that witnesses' absence at trial. It 
is submitted that such is not the case and a complete 
reading of Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of evidence makes this 
clear. 
A complete copy of Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure is attached hereto marked Exhibit "B" in the 
Addendum Section of the Brief. The last sentence of Section 
(a) of the rule on the "Use of depositions" states: 
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"A deposition previously taken may also be used as 
permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. " 
This language is not contained in the Federal Rule 32. A 
copy of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
attached in the Addendum hereto marked Exhibit "C". 
It is submitted that the language contained at the end of 
Rule 32 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the use 
of deposition "also11 as permitted by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, provides the same effect as that contained in Rule 
802 of the Federal Rules of evidence. A copy of Rule 802 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence is attached as Exhibit "A" of 
the addendum and provides. 
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by 
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or 
Act of Congress." 
The language contained in Federal Rule 802, "or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. . ."is not found in 
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The cases that have 
examined the disjunctive Federal Rules have found that Rule 
32 and Rule 804 are independent basis for the admission of a 
deposition. U.S. v. International Business Machines, 90 
F.R.D. 377, 71 A.L.R. Fed. 369 (Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1981); 
4A Moore's Federal Practice Paragraph 32.05 [2], at 32-32 (2d 
ed 1981). 
It is submitted however, that the disjunctive 
nature of the language of the Utah Rule 32 permits the use 
of a deposition as is set forth in Rule 32 o£ its use under 
Rule 804 of the Rules of Evidence. Should the court adopt 
-5-
the interpretation of the Respondent, that the Rules must be 
read to require compliance with both Rule 32 and Rule 804, 
the language of the last sentence of Rule 32 would be 
rendered meaningless. The deposition could not "also" be 
used as permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence but would 
only be used as permitted by those Rules. Such an 
interpretation is not favored. Metropolitan Water Dist. of 
Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake City, 14 Utah 2d 171, 380 P2d 
721 (1963). 
The Court's statement at page 19-20 of the first 
days transcript clearly sets forth the basis for the Court's 
denial of the use of the deposition of Scott Brown. The 
trial Court held that the deposition could not be used by 
the Defendants since Mr. Scott Brown was a party in the eyes 
of the Court. (TR-1294, pages 19-20). This is the only 
reason given by the Court. The Court, albeit, not setting 
forth whether the basis for his ruling was U.R.C.P. 32 or 
Rule 804, found that Mr. Brown was a party and that because 
a party was procuring his own absence as is required under 
Rule 32(a)(3)(B) and 32a(4), no one would be allowed to 
utilize the deposition. It is submitted that the Court made 
its ruling pursuant to Rule 32. The citations supplied to 
the Court by J & M, i.e. Bruins vs. United States Fleet 
Leasing 430 So. 2d 386 (La 1956) and Vevelstad vs. Flynn, 
230 F.2d 695, (9th Cir. 1956); in the Louisiana jurisdiction 
dealt with Rule 32 and not Rule 804. 
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As noted in the Houser v. Snap-on Tools 
Corporation, 202 F. Supp. 181 (1962) case, a corporate party 
may take the deposition of its officers as witnesses and use 
these at trial. Mr. Brown was not a party defendant in this 
proceeding, nor could he be deemed a party. The 
corporation, Brown & Elliott Construction, was the party to 
this proceeding, not Mr. Brown. The case of Colonial Realty 
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp. 546, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971), cited in the Respondent's brief for the proposition 
that an officers deposition may be excluded if they are not 
present at the time of trial, affords the Respondent little 
solace. The officer in the Colonial Realty supra case was a 
97% shareholder in the corporation, and a close reading of 
the case indicates that the Court found the Defendant 
corporation to be the alter ego of the corporation. There 
was no evidence before the court by which the court could 
determine whether Scott Brown was the alter ego of the 
corporation. 
Furthermore, the other parties to this proceeding, 
United Pacific, the Bank and the Owners were parties and Mr. 
Brown had no position with those parties at all. Mr. Brown 
was beyond the subpoena power of the Court, residing in 
Bozeman, Montana, thus qualifying under Rule 32(a)(3)(D) as 
well as under (B). It was error for the court to base its 
ruling on Mr. Brown's being a party to this action, and thus 
procuring his own absence. 
POINT I.B. 
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EVEN UNDER THE STANDARD OF RULE 804 OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO ADMIT THE DEPOSITION OF 
SCOTT BROWN, AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR AND STOCKHOLDER OF BROWN & 
ELLIOTT CONSTRUCTION, WHERE MR, BROWN RESIDED OVER 100 MILES 
FROM SALT LAKE CITY, AND WAS UNWILLING TO BE AVAILABLE FOR 
TRIAL. 
Rule 804(a)(5) requires a two pronged analysis for 
admission of a deposition in the absence of the physical 
presence of the witness. First, was the deponent amenable 
to subpoena by the court. There was uncontroverted 
testimony at trial that Mr. Brown did live in Bozeman, 
Montana at the time of the trial. (TR-1293, Vol. 3, page 
388, 11. 8-12). Certainly, Bozeman, Montana was beyond the 
jurisdiction and subpoena power of the trial court. 
The second part of the test to determine whether 
the witness is truly unavailable turns on whether the 
proponent could procure the presence of the witness by 
"other reasonable means". Professor's Louise11 and Mueller, 
in their treatise on evidence stated: 
" As discuss€id above, the 'reasonable means' 
clause has the* effect of restricting the 
situations in which the declarant is deemed 
unavailable by expanding the obligation of the 
proponent to attempt to secure his live testimony 
beyond merely exhausting the subpoena power of the 
court and attempting to depose the witness. 
Fairly read, however, the same clause in Rule 
804(a) (5) also has the effect of expanding the 
situations in which the declarant is deemed 
unavailable by limiting the obligation of the 
proponent to attempt to secure his live testimony 
where efforts of this sort are likely to be 
unproductive or too costly in the light of the 
circumstances." Louisell and Mueller, Federal 
Evidence, 1977 Volume 5, Section 486 page 1066. 
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Ohio v, Roberts, (1980, US) 64 L. 2d 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 
2531; United States v. Lowe (1979, CA 8 ND)592 F. 2d 1022, 
1024-25. 
Moreover, the uncontroverted evidence at the time 
of the trial was that Brown & Elliott Construction, the true 
party, was essentially defunct and merely a shell for the 
purposes of the trial of the matter. The real parties in 
interest in this case are United Pacific Insurance Company 
First Security Bank, and the owners of the property. Mr. 
Brown had no financial interest in the proceeding which 
could be used as leverage to obtain his presence at the 
trial. It is respectfully submitted that any attempt on the 
part of United Pacific, First Security Bank or the owners of 
the project, would have been fruitless. Mr. Brown had no 
personal interest in the matter economically, that could be 
used to coerce his attendance. Certainly such attendance 
would have been very costly to Mr. Brown in travel time and 
prolonged attendance at the trial. It is respectfully 
submitted that any attempt to coerce Mr. Brown's attendance 
by appeal to Mr. Brown's sense of moral obligation would be 
unproductive. 
The deposition evidence was most significant to 
Appellant's rebuttal of respondents' case, and dealt with 
several points material to the case, i.e. (1) the areas of 
responsibility that Mr. Brown had in Brown & Elliott 
Construction, (Scott Brown Deposition page 9 1. 25 to page 
10 1. 5), (2) the change order procedures of Brown & Elliott 
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Construction (Scott Brown Deposition page 11 11. 10-18), (3) 
Mr. Brownfs testimony that J & M had in its possession 
engineering documents, site plans, elevations, and soils 
reports before it made a bid on any phase of the job and 
conversations with Mr. Craig Young about J & M's previous 
experience with blasting on sites in the immediately 
adjacent area to the subject site (Scott Brown Deposition, 
page 17 1. 4 to p. 20 1. 20), (4) Mr. Brown's discussions 
with Mr. Young regarding the elevations on the plans, and 
blasting problems as well as scheduling problems prior to 
bidding as well as the meeting between Craig Young and Scott 
Brown at the Mt. Aire Cafe and on site, before the actual 
bidding of the job by Respondent (Scott Brown Deposition, p. 
21 1. 13 to p. 30 1. 8; Page 49 1. 14 to p. 50 1. 6), (5) 
the actual preparation and execution of the contracts by the 
parties (Scott Brown Deposition page 50 1. 6 to 1. 22), and 
(6) discussions between Mr. Brown and Craig Young after the 
commencement of the work by Respondent on the sewer and 
water line sub-subcontracts with Haleco (Scott Brown 
Deposition p. 55 1. 10 to p. 57 1. 20 and p. 77 11. 11-22). 
The evidence went to the very heart of the issues involved 
in Respondent's case. It was material error for the court 
to refuse to allow these portions of Mr. Brown's deposition 
into evidence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE RESPONDENT 
RESCISSION OF ITS CONTRACTS ON THE RIDGE PROJECT OR OTHER 
EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE A SOILS REPORT AND 
FOR THE RESPONDENT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF 
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THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATION, 
POINT II.A. 
THE RESPONDENT IS BARRED FROM ARGUING THAT THE FINDINGS 
OF THE COURT REGARDING THE RESPONDENTS MISINTERPRETATION 
OF THE ELEVATIONS ON THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS 
CONSTITUTE AN ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION SINCE 
THAT ISSUE WAS NEVER ARGUED TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
Respondents argue that the findings of fact 
establish "misrepresentation and mutual mistake of fact as 
to the meaning of the elevations shown on the plans. 
First, Respondent, at trial did not argue that the 
facts now asserted in its brief constituted 
"misrepresentation". (TR-Vol. 4, p. 16, 11. 15-25 and 167 
11 1-9). This is clearly shown by the Respondent's candid 
admission at page 18 of its brief that there are no 
conclusions regarding misrepresentation on this issue. It 
is axiomatic that matters are not presented to the trial 
court may be not raised for the first time on appeal. 
Franklin Financial vs. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983); Shayne vs. Stanley & Sons, Inc., Utah, 605 
P.2d 775 (1980). It is submitted that this portion of 
Respondents argument should not be considered. 
POINT II.B. 
THE FINDINGS AND EVIDENCE SUPPORT A FINDING OF NO 
ACTIONABLE MISREPRESENTATION WITH REGARD TO THE 
STATEMENTS OF SCOTT BROWN ON THE ELEVATIONS. 
Should the Appellate Court consider the arguments 
of Respondent on the issue of a "misrepresentation" of the 
elevations, the findings of this trial court would support a 
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finding that there was no misrepresentation of the 
elevations that would allow rescission. 
The case of Pace vs. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, Utah, 
1952, was the bellweather case for the criteria for 
establishing a case for misrepresentation. The court, in 
outlining the requirement for misrepresentation stated: 
"This being an action is deceit based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden was upon 
plaintiffs to prove all of the essential elements 
thereof. These are: (1) That a representation 
was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the 
representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) 
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. See 
Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 
P. 791; Jones v. Pingree, 73 Utah 190, 273 P. 303; 
23 Am. Jur. 773; 37 C.J.S. Fraud, Section 3, p. 
215." 
In this case the court did find it problem that 
the Respondent had not acted reasonably. (Conclusion of 
Law, 4, R-1153-54). That finding as noted above was 
supported by substantial evidence. It is submitted that 
Respondent failed to meet its burden even thought the court 
made no finding on this issue of misrepresentation. 
POINT II.C. 
THE SPECIFIC FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT 
COULD NOT REASONABLY RELY UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS 
OF SCOTT BROWN REGARDING ELEVATION IS BASED UPON 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
FOUND NO MUTUAL MISTAKE SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE 
J & M TO RELIEF FROM THE CONTRACT. 
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architect. (TR 1292 Vol. 2 page 201, 1. 13-16 and page 216 
11. 7-25). 
Mr. Young, despite this knowledge ignored the 
architect and sat down with Mr. Brown to resolve these 
"questions". If the plans were vague as to such a critical 
item as elevations to the excavating contractor then surely 
Mr. Young should have followed his own admitted experience 
and the specifications and consulted the architect rather 
than the general contractor. The findings of the court 
regarding the Respondent's lack of due diligence discovering 
the proper interpretation of the plans was clearly supported 
by the evidence of the case. 
Mutual mistake of fact allowing a party to avoid 
the contract my be found only where a mistake of both 
parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made has a material 
effect on the agreed exchange of performances. Restatement 
Second Contracts, Section 152; Bailey vs. Ewing, 671 P.2d 
1099 (Idaho App. 1983) cited favorably in Robert Langston 
Ltd. vs. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554. In this case, certainly 
the correct interpretation of the plans as to elevation was 
material to the excavating contractor, but, in light of the 
fact that the change raised the elevation thus requiring the 
J & M to excavate less material than it had previously 
thought necessary, the trial court could correctly find that 
the mistake did not have a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances. 
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Architect in accordance with his admitted standard imposed 
by himself and by the specification widely held in the 
industry. When J & M failed to conduct its affairs under 
those standards, the trial court correctly found that its 
own lack of due diligence barred it from relief for even 
mutual mistake, 
POINT III 
RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT IS BARRED BY THE FAILURE 
TO TIMELY ELECT TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT 
The law is well settled that one who claims he has 
been deceived and elects to rescind a contract by reason of 
fraud or misrepresentation, or mistake of fact must act 
promptly and unequivocally in announcing his intention, and 
adhere to it. If he continued to treat prop>erty as his own 
the right of rescission is gone and the party will be held 
bound by the contract. Perry vs. Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 
438 P.2d 813 (1968); Taylor vs. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 
222; Shappirio vs. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 24 S.Ct. 259, 48 
L.Ed. 419, Porras vs. Bass, 63 Or. App. 832, 665 P.2d 1249 
(On App. 1983) . Ralston Oil and Gas Company vs. The July 
Corporation, 719 P.2d 334 (Colo. App. 1985). 
Here, the trial court found that the subcontracts 
which J & M seeks to rescind were entered into sometime 
before June 1, 1984 on the sewer and water contract (Finding 
of Fact Nos. 8 & 9, R-1141) and approximately June 13, 1984 
on the excavation contract (Finding of Fact No. 45, R-1147). 
J & M continued to work on the project until 
October 12, 1984. (Findings of Fact, No. 60, R-1150). No 
-16-
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deposition of Scott Brown introduced into evidence at the 
time of trial, asserting that Mr. Brown had moved from the 
state of Utah to Bozeman, Montana and was not present for 
trail. The Trial Courtf apparently considering only Rule 
3 2, found that Mr. Brown was a party to the proceeding and 
that by absenting himself, procured his own absence and 
refused to admit the deposition of Mr. Brown. Appellant's 
position is that the trial court erred in refusing to admit 
the deposition for use at least by United Pacific Insurance, 
First Security Bank and the owners since Mr. Brown was not a 
party in this proceeding and that compliance had been made 
with Rule 32. Respondent contends in its brief that not 
only did the Appellants have the burden of meeting the 
requirements of Rule 3 2 but also the burden imposed by Rule 
804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Such is not the case. 
The last sentence of Rule 32(a) authorizes the use of 
depositions as are also allowed by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The rules should be read as disjunctive and not 
conjunctive as the Respondent would have the Court interpret 
the rule. Compliance with either Rule 32 or Rule 804 of the 
Rules of Evidence is sufficient to allow the use of the 
Deposition of Mr. Brown. 
This notwithstanding, the findings of the trial 
court and the evidence indicate that even if the Respondent 
is correct, that Appellants met the burden imposed by Rule 
804. Mr. Brown was clearly not subject to the subpeona 
power of the Utah court and to attempt to subpeona Mr. Brown 
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or mistake, for statements made by Mr. Brown regarding the 
elevations on the plans, and for the failure of Brown & 
Elliott Construction to provide copies of the soils report. 
The Respondent is barred from arguing that the findings of 
the trial court regarding the respondents misinterpretation 
of the elevations on the plans constitute actionable 
misrepresentation since that issue was never argued to the 
trial court. Moreover, even should this court consider that 
argrument the trial court's findings that there was no 
reasonable reliance upon those statements are supported by 
substantial evidence and would provide no basis for the 
conclusions that there was misrepresentation sufficent to 
form the basis for rescission of the contract. 
The argument of the Respondent that the court 
erred in not finding a mutual mistake of fact sufficient to 
allow rescission of the excavation contract is not supported 
by the evidence of the case. The finding of the trial court 
that J & M failed to exercise reasonable diligence is 
supported by substantial evidence and under the applicable 
law in the state of Utah forms a basis for the denial of the 
equitable rescission of the excavation contract. 
Rescission of the excavation contract is also 
barred by the failure of J & M to timely elect to rescind 
the excavation contract after the discovery of the error in 
the interpretation of the plans by J & M and after discovery 
of the problem with the bedrock resulting from the alleged 
failure to disclose the soils report. Approximately eleven 
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ADDENDUM 
- 2 3 -
Rule 802 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 
RULE 802 
A. OFFICIAL TEXT 
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or 
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority or by Act of Congress. 
Rule 32 Use of deposits »i i s i n c< HI i t proceed I* 
(a i Use of depositions. At the trial or upon t^he 
hearing of a motion OT an interlocutory proceeding, 
an> part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence applied as though the 
witness were then present and testifying, may be 
used against any party who was present or repre-
sented at the taking of the deposition or who had 
reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of 
the following provisions: 
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party 
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching 
the testimony of ta] deponent as a witness or for 
any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who 
at the time of taking the deposition was an offi-
cer, director, or managing agent, or a person des-
ignated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on 
behalf of a public or private corporation, partner-
ship or association or governmental agency 
which is a party may be used by an adverse party 
for any purpose. 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not 
a party, may be used by any party for any pur-
pose if the court finds: 
(A) that the witness is dead; or 
(B) that 'the witness is at a greater dis-
tance than 100 miles from the place of trial 
or hearing, or is out of the United States, 
unless it appears that the absence of the wit-
ness was procured by the party offering the 
deposition; or 
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or 
testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or 
imprisonment; or 
(D) that the party offering the deposition 
has been unable to procure the attendance of 
the witness by subpoena; or 
(£) upon application and notice, that such 
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it 
desirable, in the interest of justice and with 
due regard to the importance of presenting 
the testimony of witnesses orally in open 
court, to allow the deposition to be used. 
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evi-
dence by a party, an adverse party may require 
him to introduce any other part which ought in 
fairness to be considered with the part intro-
duced, and any party may introduce any other 
parts. 
Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not 
affect the right to use depositions previously taken; 
and when an action has been brought in any court of 
the United States or of any state and another action 
involving the same subject matter is afterward 
brought between the same parties or their represen-
tatives or successors in interest^ all depositions law-
fully taken and duly filed in the former action may be 
used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. A 
deposition previously taken may also be used as per-
mitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(b) Objections to admissibility. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 28(b) and Subdivision (d)(3) [(cX3)] 
of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or 
hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or 
part thereof for any reason which would require the 
exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then 
present and testifying. 
(c) Effect of errors and irregularities. 
(1) As to notice. All errors and irregularities 
in the notice for taking a deposition are waived 
unless written objection is promptly served upon 
the party giving the notice. 
(2) As to disqualification of officer. Objec-
tion to taking a deposition because of disqualifi-
cation of the officer before whom it is to be taken 
is waived unless made before the taking of the 
deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the dis-
qualification becomes known or could be discov-
ered with reasonable diligence. 
(3) As to taking of deposition. 
(A) Objections to the competency of a w it-
ness or to the competency, relevancy, or ma-
teriality of testimony are not waived by fail-
ure to make them before or during the tak-
ing of the deposition, unless the ground of 
the objection is one which might have been 
obviated, or removed if presented at 'that 
time. 
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at 
the oral examination in the manner of tak-
ing the deposition, in the form of the ques-
tions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, 
or in the conduct of parties, and errors of any 
kind which might be obviated, removed, or 
cured if promptly presented are waived un-
less seasonable objection thereto is made at 
the taking of the deposition. 
_ ( © Objections to the form of written ques-
tions submitted under Rule 31 are waived 
unless served in writing upon the party pro-
pounding them within the time allowed for 
serving the succeeding cross or other ques-
tions and within 5 days after service of the 
last questions authorized. 
(4) As to completion and return of deposi-
tion. Errors and irregularities in the manner in 
which the testimony is transcribed or the deposi-
tion is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, en-
dorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt 
with by the officer under Rules 30 and 31 are 
waived unless a motion to suppress the deposi-
tion or some part thereof is made with reasonable 
promptness after such defect is, or with due dili-
gence might have been, ascertained, 
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition 
under Subsection (a) of this rule shall have the effect 
of publishing the deposition unless the court orders 
otherwise in response to objections. 
EXHIBIT "C 
R 32 USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN COURT 326 
Rule 32. Use of Depositions in Court Proceedings. 
(a) USE OF DEPOSITIONS. At the trial or upon the hearing of a 
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a de-
position, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence ap-
plied as though the witness were then present and testifying, 
may be used against any party who was present or represented 
at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice 
thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions: 
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the pur-
pose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of depo-
nent as a witness, or for other purpose permitted by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the 
time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or 
managing agent, or a person designated under Rule 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private 
corporation, partnership or association or governmental 
agency which is a party may be used by an adverse party 
for any purpose. 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, 
may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: 
(A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a 
greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or 
hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears 
that the absence of the witness was procured by the party 
offering the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to 
attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or impris-
onment; or (D) that the party offering the deposition has 
been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by 
subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such ex-
ceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the 
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of 
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, 
to allow the deposition to be used. 
32 ; USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN COURT R 32 
(4) If only part of a deposition, is offered in evidence bj a 
party, an adverse party may require the offeror to introduce 
any other part which ought in fairness to be considered 
with the part introduced, and any party may introduce any 
other parts, 
Substitution oi fir :**• ;>U:M mi i. <* uiz It does not affect 
nght to use depositions previously taken; and, when an ac-
tion has been brought in any court of the United States or of 
any State and another action involving the same subject mat-
ter is afterward brought between the same parties or their rep-
resentatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully 
taken and duly filed in the former action may be used in the 
latter as if originally taken therefor. A deposition taken may 
also be used as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(b) OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY. Subject to the provisions 
of Rules 28(b) and subdivision (d)(3) of this rule, objection 
may be made at the trial or hearing to receiving in evidence 
any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would re-
quire the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then 
present' and testifying. 
[(c) EFFECT OF TAKING OR USING DEPOSITIONS Subdivision 
(c) is abrogated, effective July 1, 1975.]. 
(d) EFFECT OF ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES IN DEPOSITIONS, 
(1) As to Notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice 
for taking a deposition are waived unless written objection 
is promptly served upon the party giving the notice. 
(2) As to Disqualification of Officer. Objection to taking a 
deposition because of disqualification of the officer before 
whom it is to be taken is waived unless made before the 
taking of the deposition begins or as soon thereafter as the 
disqualification becomes known or could be discovered 
with reasonable diligence, 
(3) As to Taking of Deposition 
(A) Objections to the competency of a witness or to 
the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony 
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are not waived by failure to make them before or dur-
ing the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of 
the objection is one which might have been obviated or 
removed if presented at that time. 
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral 
examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in 
the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or af-
firmation, or in the conduct of parties, and errors of 
any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured 
if promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable 
objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposi-
tion. 
(C) Objections to the form of written questions sub-
mitted under Rule 31 are waived unless served in writ-
ing upon the party propounding them within the time 
allowed for serving the succeeding cross or other ques-
I tions and within 5 days after service of the last ques-
I tions authorized. 
(4) As to Completion and Return of Deposition. Errors and 
irregularities in the manner in which the testimony is tran-
scribed or the deposition is prepared, signed, certified, 
sealed, indorsed, transmitted, filed, or otherwise dealt with 
by the officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived unless a 
motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is 
made with reasonable promptness after such defect is, or 
with due diligence might have been, ascertained. 
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